The agreement contained five articles that dictated that Japan should give the United States the territorial means to establish a military presence in the Far East. In addition, the agreement prohibiting Japan from providing military bases or rights to foreign powers without the agreement of the United States. The agreement was ratified by the U.S. Senate on March 20, 1952 and signed on April 15, 1952 by U.S. President Harry Truman. The treaty came into force on April 28, 1952.  Given its obvious success in keeping Japan safe and the United States strong in East Asia, one could conclude that the agreement has a bright future. And we`d be wrong. The landslide victory of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) last August, after nearly 54 years of uninterrupted domination by the Liberal Democratic Party, raised new questions in Japan about whether the benefits of the treaty still outweigh their costs.
Despite Okinawan`s strong opposition to the U.S. military presence on the island, the agreement was also strongly supported. Fear of a new imperialist Japan led its legislators to be barred from maintaining more than one self-defense force when they designed the post-war constitution. As a result, Japan has never spent more than 1% of its GDP on military spending (Englehardt, 2010). In exchange for authorizing the U.S. military presence in Japan, the United States agreed to defend Japan against foreign opponents such as North Korea. Under American pressure, Japan worked on a comprehensive security strategy, with closer cooperation with the United States, to achieve a more recidivist and autonomous base. This policy was put to the test in November 1979, when radical Iranians occupied the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and took 60 hostages. Japan responded by condemning the action as a violation of international law. At the same time, Japanese trading companies and oil companies allegedly purchased Iranian oil, which had become available when the United States banned oil imports from Iran.
The move drew strong criticism from the United States of the Japanese government that it was “insensitive” to allowing it to buy oil, and led to a Japanese apology and agreement to participate in sanctions against Iran in coordination with other U.S. allies.  In a 2006 agreement between the George W. Bush administration and the Japanese government, MCAS Futenma was to be transferred to the northern city of Okinawa nago and 8,000 marines and their relatives were to be transferred to Guam (Packard, 2010). However, the agreement received very little support from Okinawans. After months of reflection on the new location of the base, yukio Hatoyama acknowledged that the initial agreement would continue and resigned immediately after declaring that he had not kept one of his promises. But the two chiefs were extraordinarily hamhanded in their initial affairs. One problem is the Futenma Marine Corps airbase in the city of Ginowan in Okinawa, whose 80,000 inhabitants are disrupted every two minutes by the deafening noise of American planes taking off and landing. As part of the 2006 agreement to reduce the presence of U.S. troops in Japan, the futenma base was to be transferred to the less populated city of Nago, Okinawan, and about 8,000 navy soldiers and their relatives are expected to be transferred to Guam. The United States